Static and dynamic impacts of venture capital shareholding on stock price crash risk by Yang, Bin et al.
  
 
STATIC AND DYNAMIC IMPACTS OF VENTURE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDING 
ON STOCK PRICE CRASH RISK 
 
 
 
 
 
A Project Paper 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Professional Studies in Agriculture and Life Sciences 
Field of Applied Economics and Management 
 
 
 
by 
BIN YANG, YUEFAN ZHOU, CHUANGTAO FANG, XINMEI GUO,  
XUAN YANG, MENGNI CHEN, DAWN HE 
May 2018 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2018 BIN YANG, YUEFAN ZHOU, CHUANGTAO FANG,  
XINMEI GUO, XUAN YANG, MENGNI CHEN, DAWN HE 
 ABSTRACT 
 
With the rapid development of venture capital industry in China, venture capital firms 
are playing an increasingly active role in funding startups. As more and more companies 
with venture capital shareholders go public, venture capital firms become an important 
group of institutional investors that can bring significant influence on companies’ stock 
price. In the past decade, extremely high exit returns from IPO of venture capital firms 
raised the public and Chinese scholars’ attention. However, few researches inspected 
the venture capital’s post-IPO influence. In this paper, we examine whether venture 
capital shareholding will lead to companies’ higher stock crash risk, and whether 
different venture capital shareholders’ different behavior of holding and selling after 
lockup period will have different impacts on companies’ crash risk.  
The research used descriptive statistics and regression analysis to analyze the quarterly 
data of Chinese A-share companies from 2005-2016. We found that: (1) Companies 
with venture capital shareholders in a specific quarter will have greater incentive of 
earnings management (exaggerating revenue and profit) and greater stock price crash 
risk in the next quarter then companies without venture capital shareholders. (2) Venture 
capital shareholders continuing to hold non-restricted shares after lockup period is 
considered as a positive signal, thus reduce the crash risk. Venture capital shareholders 
selling shares is considered as a negative signal, thus increase the crash risk. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, YT Jia, a famous entrepreneur and his diversified ecological empire has attracted 
great attention from many entrepreneurs, VC/PE investors and stock investors. We witnessed him 
started from Le.com, an online video company, and step by step built LeEco in the past decade. 
At his peak, LeEco was valued around $50 billion, covering various business including cellphone, 
TV set, super electric car, movies, sports, cloud computing, e-commerce, real-estates, etc, with 
every subsidiary chased by billions of venture capital. Many renowned venture capitals in China 
such as SCGC, HNA Capital and Yunfeng Capital invested YT Jia and his business to help him 
build the empire. However, endless expansion, unprofitable M&As and capital expenditures, as 
well as great capital needed to build Farady Future (the super car business) sent LeEco to the 
expectable ending - running out of cash. The collapse of the LeEco empire and the crash of 
Le.com’s stock price raise people’s reflection on the “smart capital”. Le.com is one of many “story 
telling” companies that label themselves as “new economy”, “unicorn”，“disruptive technology”, 
etc., raising considerable venture fund and go IPO, but finally fail to reach expectation or even go 
out of business. We can’t stop wondering, are those venture capitals, known as smart investors, 
hoodwinked by fantastic stories and throwing money blindly? Do they give positive guidance in 
business operation and corporate governance as supposed? Will venture capital amplify the boom 
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and crash of those invested firms, or even that of those hot industries (eg. Internet, AI, block chain 
etc.)? 
The authors of this paper believe that many venture capitals are speculators, or educated gamblers, 
instead of real growth investors. We can find many evidences that venture capitals contribute to 
the collapse of growing companies or growing industries. Dated back to the US Dotcom bubble in 
the 2000s, venture capitals crowded to invest those high-risk, unprofitable Internet startups, helped 
them to boost their “revolutionary business model”, “promising future” and “sustainable 
profitability”, and finally got substantial return by pushing them to Nasdaq. However, as is very 
common at that time, venture capitalists that invested in Pets.com and Webvan didn’t necessarily 
believe the Internet was the best way to sell pet food and groceries, but they knew that if they 
didn’t finance these firms, other VCs would. In order to pursue better performance, most of them 
continued to devote themselves to the round after round of valuation bubbles. The irrationality 
didn’t stop until the FED raised the interest rate and cooled down the market. Within one year after 
the bubble burst, for Nasdaq, the index dropped nearly 70%, 8 out of 10 companies lost over 80% 
Mkt Cap, 4 out of 10 companies delisted and over 500 companies went bankrupt. It was obvious 
that the US economy, especially the financial market and the Internet industry, went through a 
painful recession.  
In 2015, China’s ChiNext Board (established for growing companies) also witnessed an 
unprecedented technology stock bubble. The average PE ratio reached 135x and average PE ratio 
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for technology companies surpassed 250x. After the ChiNext Board Index touched the peak 
(4,037), the market suddenly collapsed and kept going down for the following two years, with the 
index value halved. By curiosity, I listed the TOP 30 ChiNext stocks with largest decrease in price 
during these 2 years and found out the IPO shareholder information from prospectus. It’s surprising 
that 26 out of 30 of these worst crashed stocks were invested by venture capitals when they went 
public. Among those venture capitals, some are famous investors such as Sequoia Capital, IDG 
Capital, Intel Capital and SZVC. But a large number of them are young domestic capitals, which 
made a lot of money and be known to the public by investing “Star Stock” such as ASXX and 
QTJY. 
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Table 1.1 TOP 30 Stocks with Largest Decrease in ChiNext Board 
Rank Stock 2015.6.5 Close ¥ 
2015.6.5-
2017.6.5 
Decrease 
VC shareholders when IPO? 
1 ASXX 168.61 85.26％ Zhangjiang Han Century Fund, Junlian Wisdom 
2 CLKJ 234.58 83.55％ China Merchants Capital 
3 DJRJ 123.81 83.20％ Equity Dynamic, WEP, Full Cycle, etc. 
4 JTL 271.26 82.21％ N/A 
5 JYKJ 55.49 82.12％ Dehui Investment、Florin Investment Group、JD Capital 
6 YZJ 114.00 80.37％ N/A 
7 RQGF 38.66 79.00％ Pingan Caizhi 
8 QTJY 153.90 78.79％ Guangdong SME Equity Investment Fund、China Capital Group 
9 SLWW 170.00 78.76％ China Business Media (Strategic Investment) 
10 HPF 167.01 78.70％ N/A 
11 WNJK 91.03 78.22％ Sunway Investment 
12 ZRKJ 161.09 77.75％ GGV Capital, Fortune Venture Capital, Intel Capital, Pingan Caizhi 
13 TBKJ 55.80 77.70％ Shenzhen Capital Group, Futian Investment, Guosen H&S, Veken Ventures 
14 WDXX 140.00 77.42％ Shanghai SAT Investment, Jinwin Investment 
15 JYJG 78.50 77.35％ N/A 
16 XKP 63.82 77.30％ Guolian Zhuocheng Ventures 
17 AJB 48.51 75.95％ Hetai Ventures, Haihui Ventures, GF Xinde Investment 
18 BLYY 60.60 75.65％ Beijing Science and Technology, IPV Capital 
19 HBKJ 179.00 75.49％ TusPark Ventures, Everbright new industry, Grains Valley Venture Capital, etc. 
20 NFKJ 96.50 75.30％ Guangdong Tongying Venture Capital 
21 KLG 81.45 75.08％ Hony Capital, Mianyang Fund, Hunan Hi-tech Venture Capital, Sequoia Capital 
22 BFKJ 241.98 75.06％ IDG Capital, Jin Haipeng Investment, Huawei Investment, Tsinghua Holdings Capital, etc. 
23 FRGF 137.99 74.93％ Kaideyuan Investment, China High-tech Investment, Ordos Asset Management 
24 XGD 137.40 74.89％ Shenzhen Venture Capital, Futian Capital, Ruichi Fenghe 
25 TXGF 186.00 74.49％ Tesir Investment, Star Moon Venture, Huijin Cube, Capesize Investment 
26 BJYY 166.00 74.29％ Fortune Capital 
27 DWX 45.70 74.04％ Oriental Fortune Capital, Shanghai Chengye Investment, ZS Venture Capital, Huarui Investment 
28 XXZY 46.61 73.89％ China Merchants Investment, CX Venture, CSC Investment 
29 LMKJ 91.80 73.68％ Lenovo Investment, Leadyond Capital 
30 TRS 45.45 73.38％ Shenzhen Capital Group, Fortune Venture Capital 
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IPO (Initial Public Offerings) is the most important and most profitable way of exit for venture 
capital. As the number of VC increases and more companies going to public have VC background, 
venture capitals are playing a more important role in the capital market, especially in the IPO 
process. In existing literatures, scholars have paid lots of attentions to venture capitals’ impact on 
the invested companies’ long term development, mainly concluding into two effects – governance 
effect and grandstanding effect. In recent research of capital market, some scholar has discussed 
heatedly about factors affecting stock price crash risk, including information disclosure, financial 
opacity, management behaviors, analyst recommendation, etc. However, few scholars figure out 
there may be strong probability that venture capital shareholders can influence listed companies’ 
stock price crash risk. Venture capitals as early investors, will add value to invested companies by 
offering capital, improving corporate governance and promoting business performance, in order 
to get higher valuation in IPO or M&A. However, since venture capitals are neither interested in 
stock investment, nor interested in holding company’s equity for a long-term, they tend to cash 
their investment at an ideally high price after success IPO. During the exit period, venture capitals 
are short-term focused and show significant grandstanding incentives. That is to say, in order to 
exit at a high price, venture capital may loosen its supervision on governance, press disclosures 
and earnings management, as well as allow management to hide bad news and release good news. 
As bad news accumulates, someday it will explode to the public at one time, which causes 
significant negative hit to company’s stock price and lead to price crash. But if there are venture 
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capital shareholders in some cases continue to hold the shares after the lock-up period, it may be 
a positive signal, which leads to lower risk of stock price crash. Venture capitals may keep holding 
shares because they expect the invested company to grow rapidly in the following quarters, or they 
don’t have immediate demand to cash their investment return out of motivated by grandstanding 
needs.  
China’s capital market is relative young - regulatory authorities are at an exploratory stage, and 
regulations and market mechanisms still need to improve. In terms of market participants, a large 
number of them are small and individual investors, who lack professional investment knowledge 
and risk awareness. Therefore, China’s stock market has significant herding effect, market 
sentiment effect and speculative atmosphere. How to avoid stock crash and market crash, and to 
stabilize the growth of the stock market is highly concerned by both academics and practitioners. 
Venture capitals as a group of the increasingly active participants of stock market and important 
external shareholders, their impact on invested companies’ stock price fluctuation should be 
further examined.  
In this paper, the author will use the venture capital shareholder data from RESSET financial 
database and trading data from CSMAR, between 2005-2016, to explore the impact of VC 
shareholding, and VC shareholders’ holding behavior after lockup period, on the stock price crash 
risk of specific company. The paper will try to answer the following questions: (1) Will venture 
capital shareholding significantly increase the stock price crash risk? (2) Will venture capital’s 
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different behaviors of holding or selling after lockup period have different effect on stock price 
crash risk? By careful empirical research, we can better understand the current status of 
development of venture capital industry, and the transmission of price risk from primary market 
to secondary market. After that, we can have better idea of how to regulate the venture capital 
industry, and also further improve the lockup mechanism and other regulatory measures, thus 
contribute to the healthy development of China’s stock market.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an overlook of literature review and research 
hypothesis. Section 3 describe the sampling process and methodology to test our hypothesis. 
Section 4 provides the descriptive analysis and regression analysis. Section 5 is the conclusion.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 Literature Review 
Venture capitals are institutional investors with capital, management experience and specific 
industry background, who provide capital for startups in exchange for equity. In order to help the 
investee companies to obtain rapid growth and increase in valuation which leads to quick and 
fruitful exit return, venture capital firms will try to make the best use of their resources (Barry et 
al., 19901, Hochberg et al, 20072) and to help startups enhance their technological advantages 
(Hellmann and Puri, 20003, Kortum and Lerner, 20014, Guo and Jiang, 20135), improve corporate 
governance and financial performance (Barry et al., 1990, Brunninge and Nordqvist, 2004 6, 
Hellmann and Puri, 20027, Long Xin and Ning Ma, 20168). Venture capitals’ value-added and 
supervision effects for startups has been recognized in many studies, especially in developed 
markets in Europe and North America, where venture capital market has developed for decades 
and venture capitals are more professional and experienced.  
However, the story can be a little different in Chinese market at current stage as most of domestic 
venture capitals are pretty young, venture capital specialists are scarce and the market environment 
is immature. Scholars haven’t got concurrent opinion about venture capital’s positive effects. 
Wang Lei and Dang Xinghua (2008) 9 found that the amount of venture capital invested was 
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positive correlated with the technological innovation, but VC’s role in increasing the number of 
patent granted was not significant. 
Wu Qiaozhen (2009) 10 and Chen Jianli (2011) 11 found that Chinese domestic venture capital 
preferred later stage investment, and make quick money by taking investee public instead of 
helping them improve core competence. Yuan Jiguo (2013) 12 found that in companies with venture 
capital background, executive compensation was more closely correlated with business 
performance. However, Jing Ming and Wang Juan (2010) 13 believed that Chinese domestic 
venture capital firms helped SMEs increase their market value but didn’t help with their corporate 
governance.  
Opposite to the above positive value-added and supervision effects, venture capitals may adversely 
influence the investees’ long-term growth, stemmed from their goal of creating highest return in 
limited fund life. "Grandstanding" is probably one of the major reasons that incentivize venture 
capital firms’ short-term focus in investees’ IPO and neglecting of investees’ dishonesty in 
information disclosures and financial reports. Gompers (1996) developed the "grandstanding" 
hypothesis suggesting that young venture firms take investees public earlier than older venture 
capital firms in order to build reputation quickly and raise capital new funds easily. To achieve 
IPO quickly, venture capital firms tend to push investees to achieve high growth in financial 
performance, which easily increase investees’ incentive of earnings management to to exaggerate 
the revenue and profit (Ning Cai, 201514, Jia Ning and Li Dan, 201115, Wu Cuifeng et al, 201216). 
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Once a company begins earnings management, it is more likely for them to continue doing so, 
which is a vicious circle, and will harm the company’s long-term financial health.  
Moreover, as the discrepancy between accounting result and real operation result accumulates, the 
truth will finally be revealed to the public which subsequently leads to the crash of companies’ 
value. According to Jin and Myers (2006)17, stock crash happens when the bad news or results 
hidden by insiders accumulated to a limit value that insiders give up and all the bad truths come 
out at once. Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009)18 used earnings management as a measure of 
the information transparency, and found that companies with lower information transparency has 
greater stock price crash risk. Other scholars also find that shareholders’ and the management’s 
behavior of holding and selling shares is related to company’s stock crash risk (Wu Zhanqi and Li 
Xiaolong, 201519, Quan Xiaofeng and Yin Hongying, 201720, Sun Shuwei et al., 201721).  
2.2 Research Hypothesis 
Since taking investee public is the most important and most profitable way for venture capital 
firms to cash the investment, venture capital firms act as a important bridge transmitting “risk and 
return” from the primary market to the secondary market, and from insiders to outside investors. 
Ideally, venture capital firms help investees grow up by providing capital, experience and value-
added services, and share the gain from IPO. However, if the venture capital firm want to get high 
return without increasing the company value of its investee, it may use its insider information 
advantage to grab short-term profit while leave crash risk for outside investors. According to 
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existing research about stock crash risk, information opacity (Hutton et al., 2009, Pan Yue at al., 
201122, Ye Kangtao et al., 201523), the management hiding bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006, Kothari 
et al., 200924) and collusions between of the management and institutional investors can aggravate 
the stock crash risk. Therefore, we propose the Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1-a: Venture capital shareholding has significant positive correlation with stock price 
crash risk. That is, venture capital shareholding will aggravate the crash risk. 
Hypothesis 1-b: Venture capital shareholding has significant negative correlation with stock price 
crash risk. That is, venture capital shareholding will reduce the crash risk. 
After IPO, there is a lockup period (usually 12 months for venture capital shareholders in China), 
after which venture capital firms can sell shares and cash the investment. In practice, sometimes 
venture capital firms will sell all shares right after the lockup period, while in some cases they will 
exit gradually and even hold a small portion for future price upsides.  
Some scholars have studied the phenomenon that venture capital firms don’t exit at once right after 
the end of the IPO lifting period. Lin and Smith (1998)25 believed that information asymmetry 
brought higher costs to insider trading, which in turn encouraged venture capital firms as insiders 
to tradeoff between the cost of continuing holding stocks and the negative market reactions brought 
about by the reduction of shares. Cummming and MacIntosh (2003)26 found that venture capital 
firms would convey positive signal for the company’s quality by retaining part of shares, in order 
to stabilize the stock price and maximize total exit revenue. 
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As most of Chinese domestic venture capital firms are young, which may have greater 
“grandstanding” incentive to establish the reputation and realize high return in a short time. Under 
this circumstance, if venture capital firms are willing to sacrifice the opportunity of reinvestment 
and hold non-restricted stocks for longer time, does this behavior send positive message for the 
company's stock price? If so, the venture capital firms’ retaining non-restricted stock, either out of 
positive outlook towards the company or reducing the negative market reaction, will lead to lower 
crash risk in the future.  
Therefore, we propose the Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2-a: Venture capital firms’ holding no-restricted shares after lockup period has 
negative correlation with stock price crash risk, that is, it will reduce the risk. 
Hypothesis 2-b: Venture capital firms’ selling shares after lockup period has positive correlation 
with stock price crash risk, that is, it will aggravate the risk.
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Sample and Data 
Based on the whole sample of 2005-2016 quarterly data of Chinese A-share listed companies, this 
paper screens the sample by using following criteria: (1) financial companies are excluded due to 
differences in accounting method from other companies; (2) stocks with special treatments are 
excluded; (3) in order to calculate variables of crash risk, samples with less than 30 trading days 
in a specific quarter are excluded according to Jin and Myers’s (2006) method. After the above 
screening, we finally get the sample of 64,281 company-quarter observations. We do the 
Winsorization for the 1st and 99th percentile of the original data to reduce the disturbance of 
extreme values. We get the stock trading data and financials from the CSMAR database, and get 
the special data related to venture capital shareholdings from the RESSET database. 
3.2 Variables Specification 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Stock Price Crash, refers to a sudden and sharp drop in the stock price without any warning (Chen 
Guojin et al., 2008)27. According to prior researches (Chen et al., 200128; Kim et al., 2011a29, 
2001b30;), we also measure the stock price crash risk by negative coefficient of skewness of firm 
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specific daily returns (NCSKEW) and down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). The detailed calculation 
method is as follows: 
Firstly, we run the regression analysis on every daily return for every individual stock in the sample, 
using the market daily return of 5 trading days before and 5 trading days after 𝑡𝑡 as explanatory 
variables: 
𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝜶𝜶𝒊𝒊 + ∑ 𝜷𝜷𝒊𝒊,𝒏𝒏 × 𝒓𝒓𝒎𝒎,𝒕𝒕−𝒏𝒏𝟓𝟓𝒏𝒏=−𝟓𝟓 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕   (1)  
ri,t is the daily return on stock 𝑖𝑖 on the day 𝑡𝑡. is the daily return of the market index on day 𝑡𝑡. By 
adding lead and lag market returns to the model, we can eliminate the noise resulted from 
nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979)31. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the residual term of the model, representing the 
part of daily return that cannot be explained by market returns (or market fluctuations), which also 
called firm specific return. In this paper, we take logarithm to reduce the skewness of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ’s 
distribution, and define 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 as the firm specific daily return: 
𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 = 𝒍𝒍𝒏𝒏�𝟏𝟏 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕�  (2)  
The first measure of crash risk - negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW), is calculated as the 
inverse of the third central moment of firm specific daily returns scaled by the variance of firm-
specific daily return raised to 3/2: 
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = −�𝒏𝒏(𝒏𝒏 − 𝟏𝟏)𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟐 ∑𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕𝟑𝟑 � � (𝒏𝒏 − 𝟏𝟏)(𝒏𝒏 − 𝟐𝟐)�∑𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐 �𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟐��     (3) 
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𝑞𝑞, 𝑛𝑛 represent that stock 𝑖𝑖 is traded for 𝑛𝑛 days in quarter 𝑞𝑞. The larger the value of NCSKEW, the 
more negative skewed the stock return, the greater the crash risk. 
The other measure of crash risk - down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). We rank the firm specific daily 
return from high to low and divide into two groups. DUVOL is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of lower-than-average group’s standard deviation divided by higher-than-average group’s standard 
deviation.  
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝒍𝒍𝒏𝒏��(𝒏𝒏𝒖𝒖 − 𝟏𝟏)∑ 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 � �(𝒏𝒏𝒅𝒅 − 𝟏𝟏)∑ 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑼𝑼 �� �       (4) 
𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢 is the number of firm specific daily returns of company 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑞𝑞 that are higher than the 
quarter’s average, while 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 is the number of firm specific daily returns of firm 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑞𝑞 that 
are lower than the quarter’s average. The larger the DUVOL value, the more negative skewed the 
firm specific return, the greater the crash risk. 
Besides Crash Risk variables, the paper also introduces the Discretionary Accural (DA) as a proxy 
of earnings management to further explore whether venture capital shareholder impact company’s 
stock crash risk through influence on earning management. We use the Jones’ (1991) model to do 
regression analysis on the Total Accrual (TA): 
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒
𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 = 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 ∆𝑹𝑹𝑵𝑵𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒     (5) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the total accruals, as calculated by 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − (∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, where 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 is the increment in current asset, is ∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 the increment in cash and cash equivalent, is ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
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the increment in current liability, ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the increment in debt repayment within one year, 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
is the amount of depreciation and amortization. ∆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 is the increment in revenue and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is the 
value of property, plant and equipment (Su Dongwei and Lin Dapang, 2010)32. 
We calculate the modified Discretionary Accruals (Dechow et al, 1995) by equation (6), using 
coefficients got from the above regression. ∆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 is the increment in net account receivables. If 
the DA value is positive, the larger the value, the greater the positive earnings management 
(exaggerating the earnings). If the DA value is negative, the larger the value, the greater the 
negative earning management (hinding the earnings). If the DA value is close to zero, the earning 
is fairly reflected. 
𝑫𝑫𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 − 𝜷𝜷�𝟏𝟏 𝟏𝟏𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 − 𝜷𝜷�𝟐𝟐 � ∆𝑹𝑹𝑵𝑵𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 −  ∆𝑹𝑹𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏� − 𝜷𝜷�𝟑𝟑 𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏     (6) 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
First, we set up two rules to determine whether a listed company has venture capital stockholding 
background. (1) We define a dummy variable 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 to describe whether the company has ever 
had venture capital shareholders during 2005-2016. If there are venture capitals in top 10 
shareholders in any sample quarter, the value of 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is 1. Otherwise, the value of 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is 
0. (2) We define another dummy variable to describe specifically whether company 𝑖𝑖 has VC 
shareholder in quarter 𝑞𝑞. If company 𝑖𝑖 has venture capitals listed in top 10 shareholders in quarter 
𝑞𝑞, the value of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is 1， otherwise 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is 0. 
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Then, to further analyze the different impacts of venture capital shareholders’ after-lockup-period 
holding or selling behaviors on stocks’ crash risk, we use two proxies: non-restricted shares and 
selling of shares in specific quarters. (1) We define a dummy variable  
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 as whether the venture capital shareholder holds company 𝑖𝑖’s non-restricted shares in 
quarter 𝑞𝑞 . If true, the value is 1; otherwise the value is 0. (2) We define dummy variable 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  as whether the venture capital sells company 𝑖𝑖’s shares in quarter 𝑞𝑞 . If the VC 
shareholder sells company 𝑖𝑖’s shares in quarter 𝑞𝑞, the value of 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is 1, otherwise the 
value is 0. 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
With reference to the literature about the stock crash risk (Kim et a1., 2011a, 2011b; Xu et al., 
2012), this article also includes a set of commonly used control variables that are deemed to be 
potential predictors of crash risk. 𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  is the average abnormal turnover, calculated the 
difference between the stock 𝑖𝑖’s average monthly turnover of quarter 𝑞𝑞 and its average monthly 
turnover of quarter 𝑞𝑞 − 1 . 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  is the average firm specific return, defined as company 𝑖𝑖 ’s 
average firm specific daily return in quarter 𝑞𝑞. 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is the firm specific volatility, defined as the 
volatility of the company 𝑖𝑖 ’s firm specific daily return over quarter 𝑞𝑞 . 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  is firm size, 
calculated as the log of the company 𝑖𝑖’s book value of total assets in the quarter 𝑞𝑞. 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is the 
book-to-market ratio, defined as the ratio of the company 𝑖𝑖’s market value of equity to its book 
value of equity in the quarter 𝑞𝑞. 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is the financial leverage, defined as the company 𝑖𝑖’s total 
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debt scaled by total assets. 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 is the return on assets, defined as the company 𝑖𝑖’s net income 
scaled by total assets. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 represents the company accounting transparency, defined as the 
absolute value of the company 𝑖𝑖’s Discretionary Accruals (DA) in the quarter 𝑞𝑞. The greater the 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞, the lower the transparency of the company.  
Table 3.1 Variable Table 
 Variable Name Variable Symbol Variable Definitions 
Explained 
Variable 
Share price collapse 
risk 
NCSKEW i,q 
Quarterly coefficient of negative returns of q company i 
stock returns, as defined in formula (3) 
DUVOL i,q 
The fluctuation ratio of company i's stock returns in 
quarter q, as defined in formula (4) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Venture capital target Dtreat i,q 
Whether company i has venture capital to hold its 
shares during the sample period  
Venture capital 
holdings DVC i,q 
Whether company i has venture capital holdings in 
quarter q 
Venture capital holds 
unrestricted shares Drestrs i,q  
Whether company i has venture capital to hold its 
unrestricted shares in quarter q 
Venture capital 
reduction Dholdsell i,q 
Whether company i has a reduction of venture capital -
owned shares in quarter q  
Control 
Variables 
Average excess 
turnover rate ΔTurn i,q 
The difference between the monthly average turnover 
rate of company i in quarter q and the average monthly 
turnover rate in quarter q-1 
Specific mean return  Ret i,q Company i's average specific rate of return in quarter q 
Specific return 
volatility  Vol i,q 
The standard deviation of unique earnings of company i 
in quarter q 
Company Size Size i,q 
Company i’s total assets book value in quarter q(taking 
natural logarithm) 
Book value to market 
ratio BM i,q 
Total shareholder’s equity for company i divided by 
total market capitalization in quarter q 
Financial Leverage Lev i,q 
Total liabilities of company i divided by total assets in 
quarter q  
Return on total assets Roa i,q 
Company i's net profit divided by total assets in quarter 
q 
Corporate 
transparency AbsDAi,q 
The absolute value of steerable accruals for company i 
in quarter q  
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3.3 Model Design 
According to the previous theoretical basis and hypothesis, this paper wants to study the impact of 
venture capitals’ shareholding on the stocks’ crash risk and the different influences of their holding 
or selling behavior after the lockup period on the crash risk. Firstly, we need to examine whether 
venture capitals’ shareholding has significant impact on stocks’ crash risk, and whether it enhances 
or reduces the crash risk. Then, we further examine whether venture capitals’ different behavior 
of holding or selling the stock after lockup period will have different impacts on the crash risk.  
To test the first hypothesis, we build two models by two steps. To begin with, we generally inspect 
whether those companies that once had venture capital shareholders during 2005-2016 have 
significant different characteristic in crash risk with other companies that didn’t have venture 
capital shareholders, with industry effect and quarter effect controlled.  
𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜸𝜸𝑵𝑵𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕     (7) 
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  is proxied by 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞  and 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞 . 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1  is the dummy variable to 
describe whether the company 𝑖𝑖 has venture capital background, which does not change with time. 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 is the set of control variables. 𝛽𝛽1 measures the difference in crash risk between those 
companies with venture capital background and those without. If the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 is significant, 
it suggest that the companies with venture capital background has significant difference in risk 
characteristics in stock crash with others no VC background companies. The difference may be 
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caused by some specific firm fundamentals that don’t change along time, either caused by venture 
capital investment or attract venture capital to invest. Besides, if the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 is significant, 
it also suggests that the research is subjected to significant endogenous selection bias. In that case, 
we can’t prove the casual relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable. 
However, if the the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 is not significant, it eliminates the endogenous problem. 
Based on the above model, we add the variable 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 to the model (8) to further explore the 
impact of venture capital shareholding in current period on the crash risk in the next period.  
𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜸𝜸𝑵𝑵𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕   (8) 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 is a dummy variable measuring whether company 𝑖𝑖 has venture capital shareholders in 
the quarter 𝑞𝑞. If 𝛽𝛽2 is significantly positive, it indicates that venture capitals’ shareholding will 
significantly aggravate the stock crash risk. If β2 is significantly negative, it indicates that venture 
capitals’ shareholding will significantly reduce the stock crash risk. 
To test the second hypothesis, we establish two parallel models – model (9) and model (10). On 
one hand, in the model (9), the interactive variable 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 is introduced to the 
model, describing whether company 𝑖𝑖’s venture capital shareholders continue to hold unrestricted 
shares in quarter 𝑞𝑞 after the lockup period. If 𝛽𝛽3 is significantly positive, it indicates that venture 
capitals’ holding non-restricted shares after lockup period will significantly aggravate the crash 
risk and the impact is even worse than just holding restricted shares. If 𝛽𝛽3 is significantly negative, 
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it indicates that venture capitals’ holding non-restricted shares after lockup period will 
significantly reduce the crash risk against the baseline impact caused by holding restricted shares. 
𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 × 𝑫𝑫𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 +                                 𝜸𝜸𝑵𝑵𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕   (9) 
On the other hand, the interactive variable 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞−1 is introduced to the model 
(10), describing whether company 𝑖𝑖’s venture capital shareholders sell company’s shares in quarter 
𝑞𝑞 after the lockup period. If 𝛽𝛽3 is significantly positive, it indicates that compared with continuing 
holding, venture capitals’ selling shares after lockup period will significantly aggravate the next 
period’s crash risk. If 𝛽𝛽3  is significantly negative, it indicates that compared with continuing 
holding, venture capitals’ selling shares after lockup period will significantly reduce the next 
period’s crash risk. 
𝑵𝑵𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑨𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 × 𝑫𝑫𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒅𝒅𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏 +                                 𝜸𝜸𝑵𝑵𝑪𝑪𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒓𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒊,𝒒𝒒−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕   (9) 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables designed in this study. In order to 
reduce the influence of extreme values on the study results, we do the Winsorization for the 1st 
and 99th percentile of the original data. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics Table of Main Variables 
VARIABLES mean sd p5 p50 p95 N 
Panel A Dependent Variables 
NCSKEW -0.422 0.836 -1.748 -0.430 0.930 64281 
DUVOL -0.331 0.673 -1.396 -0.349 0.804 64281 
DA 0.004 0.046 -0.067 0.004 0.074 64281 
Panel B Independent Variables 
Dtreat 0.236 0.424 0 0 1 64281 
DVC 0.053 0.224 0 0 1 64281 
Drestrs 0.042 0.200 0 0 0 64281 
Dholdsell 0.013 0.111 0 0 0 64281 
Panel C Control Variables 
ΔTurn 0.114 0.760 -0.578 0.001 1.183 64281 
Ret 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.004 64281 
Vol 0.023 0.009 0.011 0.022 0.037 64281 
Size 21.790 1.253 20.100 21.630 24.170 64281 
BM 0.414 0.266 0.106 0.353 0.939 64281 
Lev 0.457 0.213 0.099 0.468 0.793 64281 
Roa 0.011 0.019 -0.012 0.009 0.042 64281 
absDA 0.032 0.034 0.002 0.021 0.099 64281 
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𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 are proxies of stock price crash risk. The larger the index value, the greater 
the crash risk. As we can see from the Table 4.1, for 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁, the mean is -0.422, the median -
0.430 and the standard deviation 0.836, while for 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶, the mean is -0.331, the median -0.349 
and the standard deviation 0.673. Both of two variables reflect that the stock price crash risk has 
large variation, and that the distributions slightly right skewed. The skewness suggests that there 
are a few extreme large values (high risk) in the sample. 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 is the Discretionary Accruals. The 
mean and median of 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 is 0.004, the 5th percentile (-0.067) is smaller than the 95th percentile 
(0.074) in absolute term, suggesting positive earnings management is more frequent than negative 
earnings management. 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 represents whether the listed company has ever been an invested by venture capital firms 
during the sample period. The average value is 0.236, which means that of all the listed companies, 
less than a quarter of companies had venture capital background. 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 represents whether the 
listed company has venture capital shareholders in each quarter in the sample period. the mean of 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 (0.053) suggests that on average there are only 5.3% of companies have venture capital 
shareholders at a time point. The mean of 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  (0.042) suggests that only 4.2% of all 
observations have venture capital shareholders holding non-restricted shares. The mean of 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 (0.013) suggests that only 1.3% observations have venture capital shareholders selling 
shares.  
24 
 
The rest are descriptive statistics of control variables. By controlling these variables, we can better 
study the correlations between dependent variables and independent variables. 
We further divide the sample into VC-backed group and non-VC-backed group by the value of 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶. We aim to compare the differences in the stock crash risk, earnings management, financial 
indicators, and market performance between two groups. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics Table of Main Variables by Groups 
VARIABLES Non-VC-backed(DVC=0) VC-backed(DVC=1) 
 mean sd p50 N mean sd p50 N 
NCSKEW -0.424 0.835 -0.433 60863 -0.379 0.841 -0.381 3418 
DUVOL -0.334 0.673 -0.353 60863 -0.286 0.671 -0.303 3418 
DA 0.004 0.046 0.003 60863 0.008 0.041 0.007 3418 
ΔTurn 0.118 0.764 0.002 60863 0.047 0.700 -0.009 3418 
Ret 0.000 0.003 0.000 60863 0.000 0.003 0.000 3418 
Vol 0.023 0.009 0.022 60863 0.023 0.008 0.022 3418 
Size 21.810 1.260 21.650 60863 21.450 1.065 21.250 3418 
BM 0.414 0.266 0.352 60863 0.427 0.265 0.367 3418 
Lev 0.461 0.212 0.473 60863 0.383 0.212 0.379 3418 
Roa 0.011 0.019 0.009 60863 0.011 0.018 0.009 3418 
absDA 0.032 0.034 0.021 60863 0.030 0.031 0.020 3418 
 
From Table 4.2, we can get following implications. (1) The values of 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 in 
VC-backed group are significantly larger than the values in non VC-backed group, indicating that 
VC-backed companies have larger crash risk in the next period than non-VC-backed companies. 
(2) The VC-backed group has higher 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 than non-VC-backed group, which suggest that VC-
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backed companies have stronger incentives for positive earnings management non-VC-backed 
companies. This is contrary to the supervision hypothesis and in support of grandstanding 
hypothesis. (3) VC-backed group has lower 𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 than non-VC-backed companies, indicating 
VC-backed companies has worse liquidity. On the one hand, this to some extent reflect the fact 
that many VC-backed companies have at least some part of their shares still restricted from trading. 
On the other hand, stocks with poor liquidity are more prone to crash. (4) VC-backed companies 
have lower financial leverage than non-VC-backed companies, which is related to their small asset 
size and poor liquidity. (5) VC-backed companies has smaller size and higher book-to-market ratio 
than non-VC-booker companies, while no significant difference in firm-specific return and return 
to equity. 
We also look at the distributions of 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 , 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶, and 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇, and compare the difference 
between VC-backed group and non-VC backed group. From the following figures, we can see that 
for all variables 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁, 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 and 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇, distribution of VC-backed group is on the right of 
non-VC-group. The result suggests that there is systematic deviation in the stock price crash risk 
and earnings management between VC-backed group and non-VC-backed group. After descriptive 
and qualitative analysis, we will go through a more accurate and thorough regression analysis to 
further examine the hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.1 Probability Distribution of NCSKEW  
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.2 Probability Distribution of DUVOL  
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Figure 4.3 Probability Distribution of DA  
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4.2 Results Analysis 
4.2.1 Venture Capital Shareholding and Stock Price Crash Risk 
Table 4.3 Venture Capital Background and Crash Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t NCSKEW t DUVOL t 
Dtreat t-1 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.004  
(0.87) (1.45) (0.38) (0.61) 
NCSKEW t-1   0.041*** 0.023***  
  (7.16) (4.80) 
ΔTurn t-1   0.004 -0.000  
  (0.82) (-0.01) 
Ret t-1   43.588*** 40.006***  
  (14.49) (12.98) 
Vol t-1   11.977*** 10.141***  
  (12.37) (10.42) 
Size t-1   0.032*** 0.014***  
  (7.08) (4.38) 
BM t-1   -0.402*** -0.260***  
  (-19.25) (-17.14) 
Lev t-1   -0.232*** -0.181***  
  (-11.06) (-11.70) 
Roa t-1   -1.004*** -1.233***  
  (-5.39) (-8.43) 
AbsDA t-1   0.154 0.052  
  (1.60) (0.69) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.101 0.130 0.149 0.184 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.3 is the regression result of Model (7), which examines whether companies which had 
been once invested by venture capital will have systematic difference in stock price crash risk from 
companies with no venture capital background. The results using two different crash risk proxies 
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are very close, and both suggest that VC background is positive correlated to greater crash risk but 
the coefficient is not significant. The result to some extent reduces the problem of selection bias. 
The insignificant result proves that the difference in crash risk is not caused by some firm-specific 
characteristics that don’t change by time, and lays a good foundation for the following analysis. 
Table 4.4 Venture Capital Shareholding and Crash Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t DA t NCSKEW t DUVOL t DA t 
Dtreat t-1 -0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 0.001 
 (-0.04) (0.23) (0.36) (-0.67) (-0.59) (1.07) 
DVC t-1 0.037** 0.033*** 0.002** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.002** 
 (2.20) (2.74) (2.41) (2.61) (2.84) (2.37) 
NCSKEW t-1    0.041*** 0.023*** 0.001*** 
    (7.15) (4.79) (3.43) 
ΔTurn t-1    0.004 0.000 -0.001*** 
    (0.87) (0.04) (-2.68) 
Ret t-1    43.573*** 39.993*** -0.018 
    (14.48) (12.98) (-0.20) 
Vol t-1    11.971*** 10.136*** 0.020 
    (12.35) (10.41) (0.64) 
Size t-1    0.032*** 0.014*** 0.002*** 
    (7.12) (4.43) (7.61) 
BM t-1    -0.403*** -0.261*** -0.007*** 
    (-19.29) (-17.18) (-5.67) 
Lev t-1    -0.229*** -0.179*** -0.012*** 
    (-10.93) (-11.57) (-8.94) 
Roa t-1    -1.005*** -1.234*** 0.234*** 
    (-5.39) (-8.42) (16.47) 
AbsDA t-1    0.157 0.054 0.089*** 
    (1.63) (0.73) (9.65) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.101 0.130 0.0677 0.149 0.184 0.0887 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.4 is the regression result of Model (8), which examines the impact of venture capital 
shareholding on companies’ stock crash risk. From the regression results (1), (2), (4) and (5), the 
significantly positive coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1  under the significance level of 0.01 indicates that 
companies with venture capital shareholders in a certain quarter will have greater stock crash risk 
in the next quarter than other non-VC companies. From regression results (3) and (6), we find 
significantly positive correlation between venture capital shareholding and next period’s positive 
earnings management. That means companies with venture capital shareholders in a certain quarter 
will have great incentive of positive earnings management in the next quarter than other non-VC 
companies. 
To conclude: companies with venture capital shareholders in a specific quarter will have greater 
incentive of earnings management (exaggerating revenue and profit) and greater stock price crash 
risk in the next quarter. Since we have found out in the preliminary regression that firm-specific 
characteristic which may attract VC investment is not a major cause of significant greater crash 
risk, our result here is in support of the view that existence of venture capital shareholder is the 
cause of greater incentive of positive earnings management and greater crash risk in the future. 
The result of model (8) supports the hypothesis 1-a. 
4.2.2 Venture Capital’s behavior after lock-up period and Stock Price Crash Risk 
Through the test above, we have examined the static effects of venture capital shareholding on 
companies’ stock crash risk. In this part, we will look at different influences of venture 
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shareholders’ behavior of holding or selling shares after lockup period on the companies’ stock 
crash risk.  
Table 4.5 Venture Capital Shareholder Holding or Selling Shares and Crash Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t NCSKEW t DUVOL t 
Dtreat t-1 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004  
(-0.67) (-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.59) 
DVC t-1 0.105*** 0.092*** 0.032* 0.032**  
(3.62) (3.85) (1.89) (2.18) 
DVC t-1 ×Drestrs t-1 -0.082** -0.074***    
(-2.51) (-2.85)   
DVC t-1 ×Dholdsell t-1   0.079*** 0.052** 
   (2.87) (2.32) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.023***  
(7.15) (4.79) (7.15) (4.79) 
ΔTurn t-1 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000  
(0.94) (0.11) (0.83) (0.01) 
Ret t-1 43.557*** 39.978*** 43.564*** 39.987***  
(14.45) (12.95) (14.47) (12.97) 
Vol t-1 11.944*** 10.111*** 11.961*** 10.130***  
(12.29) (10.36) (12.33) (10.40) 
Size t-1 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.014***  
(7.09) (4.39) (7.12) (4.43) 
BM t-1 -0.402*** -0.261*** -0.403*** -0.261***  
(-19.27) (-17.16) (-19.29) (-17.18) 
Lev t-1 -0.228*** -0.178*** -0.229*** -0.179***  
(-10.88) (-11.50) (-10.94) (-11.57) 
Roa t-1 -1.009*** -1.238*** -1.006*** -1.235***  
(-5.41) (-8.45) (-5.39) (-8.42) 
AbsDA t-1 0.158* 0.056 0.156 0.054  
(1.65) (0.74) (1.62) (0.71) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.149 0.184 0.151 0.185 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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From the regression table, we can see the results using 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 as proxies of crash 
risk are very close. From the regression results (1) and (2), we find that the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 
is significantly positive and the coefficient of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1  is significantly negative, 
which indicate the stock crash risk in the next quarter increases significantly if venture capital 
firms hold the company’s restricted stock, while stock crash risk in the next period won’t see 
significant increase if venture capital firms hold the company’s non-restricted stock. Venture 
capital firms holding non-restricted shares after lockup period conveys positive signal to the public 
and offset the general negative impact of venture capital shareholding.  
From regressions (3) and (4), we can find that the coefficients of 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1  and 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 ×
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡−1  are significantly positive, which indicates that venture capital firms holding 
company shares in a specific quarter will generally increase the crash risk in the next quarter and 
that venture capital firms selling shares in specific quarter will dramatically aggravate the crash 
risk in the next quarter.   
To conclude, our regression results support the hypothesis 2-a and 2-b. If venture capital firms 
hold the company’s restricted shares, the next quarter crash risk of the company will be 
significantly higher than other non-VC companies. If venture capital firms hold the company’s 
non-restricted shares, the next quarter crash risk won’t be significantly higher than other non-VC 
companies. If venture capital firms sell the company’s shares in a specific quarter, this selling 
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behavior will further increase the next period crash risk compared to the static venture capital 
shareholding effect.  
4.3 Robust Test 
In China’s capital market, some listed companies will set up a special purpose company or 
partnership to hold a portion of shares in order to take advantage of leverage, to avoid disclosure 
of ownership structure, or implementing stock incentives. These special purpose entities usually 
call themselves as “investment firms”, investment management firms”, or “xx capital”, and 
describe their business as investment or venture capital related. In research about venture capital, 
it is difficult to screen out those fake venture capital firms, because we currently identify venture 
capital firms by looking at their names and main business. In this paper, we propose a way to 
reduce this problem – if a venture capital firm only hold one listed company’s share in the sample 
period, we don’t consider it as real venture capital firm. According to this rule, we re-group the 
sample and re-assign value to independent variables. We run all the regression tests again to see 
whether our results are robust. The regression results are as follows: 
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Table 4.6 Venture Capital Background and Crash Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t NCSKEW t DUVOL t 
Dtreat t-1 0.014 0.012* 0.009 0.006 
 
(1.40) (1.80) (0.97) (1.00) 
NCSKEW t-1   0.041*** 0.023*** 
 
  (7.16) (4.80) 
ΔTurn t-1   0.004 -0.000 
 
  (0.82) (-0.00) 
Ret t-1   43.586*** 40.003*** 
 
  (14.49) (12.98) 
Vol t-1   11.976*** 10.141*** 
 
  (12.36) (10.42) 
Size t-1   0.032*** 0.014*** 
 
  (7.09) (4.39) 
BM t-1   -0.402*** -0.260*** 
 
  (-19.25) (-17.15) 
Lev t-1   -0.231*** -0.181*** 
 
  (-11.05) (-11.70) 
Roa t-1   -1.004*** -1.234*** 
 
  (-5.39) (-8.43) 
AbsDA t-1   0.154 0.052 
 
  (1.60) (0.69) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.101 0.130 0.149 0.184 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.7 Venture Capital Shareholding and Crash Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t DA t NCSKEW t DUVOL t DA t 
Dtreat t-1 0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.37) (0.46) (0.45) (-0.14) (-0.27) (0.83) 
DVC t-1 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.002** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.002** 
 (2.61) (3.15) (2.20) (2.79) (3.07) (2.21) 
NCSKEW t-1    0.041*** 0.023*** 0.001*** 
    (7.15) (4.79) (3.43) 
ΔTurn t-1    0.004 0.000 -0.001*** 
    (0.87) (0.04) (-2.68) 
Ret t-1    43.572*** 39.991*** -0.018 
    (14.48) (12.98) (-0.21) 
Vol t-1    11.966*** 10.133*** 0.020 
    (12.34) (10.40) (0.64) 
Size t-1    0.032*** 0.015*** 0.002*** 
    (7.15) (4.45) (7.57) 
BM t-1    -0.403*** -0.261*** -0.007*** 
    (-19.31) (-17.20) (-5.67) 
Lev t-1    -0.229*** -0.180*** -0.012*** 
    (-10.94) (-11.58) (-8.94) 
Roa t-1    -1.004*** -1.234*** 0.233*** 
    (-5.39) (-8.43) (16.47) 
AbsDA t-1    0.157 0.055 0.089*** 
    (1.63) (0.73) (9.66) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.101 0.130 0.0677 0.149 0.184 0.0887 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.8 Venture Capital Shareholder Holding or Selling Shares and Crash Risk  
(4) (5) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES NCSKEW t DUVOL t NCSKEW t DUVOL t 
Dtreat t-1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(-0.14) (-0.27) (-0.14) (-0.27) 
DVC t-1 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.029 0.030** 
 
(3.43) (4.06) (1.42) (2.03) 
DVC t-1 ×Drestrs t-1 -0.091** -0.095***   
 
(-2.34) (-3.11)   
DVC t-1 ×Dholdsell t-1   0.080** 0.052* 
   (2.52) (1.89) 
NCSKEW t-1 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 
 
(7.14) (4.78) (7.15) (4.79) 
ΔTurn t-1 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
 
(0.93) (0.11) (0.83) (0.02) 
Ret t-1 43.558*** 39.977*** 43.568*** 39.989*** 
 
(14.45) (12.95) (14.47) (12.97) 
Vol t-1 11.941*** 10.107*** 11.960*** 10.129*** 
 
(12.29) (10.35) (12.33) (10.40) 
Size t-1 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 
 
(7.11) (4.41) (7.14) (4.45) 
BM t-1 -0.402*** -0.261*** -0.403*** -0.261*** 
 
(-19.29) (-17.17) (-19.32) (-17.21) 
Lev t-1 -0.228*** -0.178*** -0.229*** -0.180*** 
 
(-10.89) (-11.50) (-10.95) (-11.58) 
Roa t-1 -1.006*** -1.235*** -1.005*** -1.234*** 
 
(-5.40) (-8.44) (-5.39) (-8.43) 
AbsDA t-1 0.157 0.055 0.156 0.054 
 
(1.64) (0.73) (1.62) (0.72) 
Quarter Effect YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effect YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.149 0.184 0.149 0.184 
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 64,281 
t-statistics in parentheses，*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The regression results are consistent with the original regression: venture capital shareholding has 
significantly positive correlation with the earnings management and the crash risk. After adding 
the interactive variables of the holding non-restricted shares and selling, the outcomes are also 
consistent with the previous results: the non-restricted term has significant negative correlation 
with the crash risk while the selling term has significantly positive correlation with the crash risk. 
This shows that the results of this study are robust and credible.
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, our empirical analysis is based on the quarterly trading data, financial data and 
shareholder data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2016. First, we examine the 
impact of venture capital shareholding on companies’ stock crash risk. Then we also look at 
different influences of venture shareholders’ behavior of holding or selling shares after lockup 
period on the companies’ stock crash risk. Based on the regression results, our conclusions are as 
follows. 
1. Companies which had been once invested by venture capital firms (also called companies with 
VC background) don’t have significantly greater stock crash risk than companies without VC 
background. That means, in the following test, firm-specific characteristics that may attract venture 
capital investment are not major cause to explain the difference in crash risk between companies 
with venture capital shareholders and companies without venture capital shareholders.  
2. Companies with venture capital shareholders in a specific quarter will have greater incentive of 
earnings management (exaggerating revenue and profit) and greater stock price crash risk in the 
next quarter then companies without venture capital shareholders. This result agrees to the 
“Grandstanding” theory that, venture capital firms who want to cash their investments in the next 
quarter will loose their supervision over companies’ positive earnings management in order to exit 
at a higher price.  
3. If venture capital firms hold the company’s non-restricted shares, the next quarter crash risk 
won’t be significantly higher than other non-VC companies. Therefore, venture capital firms 
continuing to hold non-restricted shares after lockup period is considered as positive message by 
the market. However, if venture capital firms sell shares in specific quarter, the stock crash risk 
will dramatically aggravate, and is much higher than other non-VC companies in the next quarter.  
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To sum up, this paper finds that generally companies with venture capital shareholders in a specific 
quarter will have higher stock price crash risk than companies without venture capital shareholders. 
By adding a treatment variable, we eliminate the possibility that some firm-specific characteristics 
causing higher crash risk attract venture capital investment. Therefore, we tend to believe venture 
capital shareholding is one of significant factors that will aggravate companies’ stock crash risk. 
Taking the investee public and holding its shares are the last two steps before venture capital firms 
sell shares and cash the investment. In china, many venture capital firms at this period focus on 
short-term profit instead of investees’ long-term development. In order to achieve higher exit 
return, they may trade on inside information, wink at the management’s tricks such as hiding bad 
news, disclosing good news and positive earnings management. Therefore, either because of 
venture capital firms know some bad will happen, or because of the market consider insiders 
selling as a negative signal, the companies’ stock crash risk will increase after venture capital 
shareholders sell companies’ shares. On the contrary, if venture capital shareholders continue to 
hold shares after lockup period, companies’ stock crash risk will decrease and be indifferent from 
non-VC companies. The market considers the venture capital shareholders’ holding behavior as 
positive signal – good quality of company or less grandstanding incentive of venture capital. 
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